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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The traditional engineering understanding of efficiency is the 
optimization of output given a fixed input. The systems approach of 
engineering identifies three major components in any process of con­
verting scarce resources into desirable goods and services: the input of 
the factors of production (manpower, capital, technology, informa­
tion), the transfer function (procedures and organization of production), 
and the output. Traditionally, engineering has concentrated on that 
aspect of efficiency pertaining to the optimal allocation of the factors 
of production. In public management, efforts in this direction have 
included work measurement, resource allocation modeling, improved 
scheduling, routing and location techniques, inventory and materials 
control, and capital budgeting.
Efficiency also depends on the nature of the transfer function. 
Two important considerations here are the incentive structures for 
employees and organizational design both within and outside the pro­
duction unit. Attempts to improve efficiency through personnel man­
agement reform include monetary incentives, personnel performance 
appraisal, use of management-by-objectives, profit sharing, job en­
richment, and in-service training. W ith respect to organizational 
change, various institutional arrangements are being experimented with 
in local government which introduce competitive elements into public 
service delivery and/or incorporate higher levels of cooperation between




governmental units; e.g., consolidation, decentralization, contracting 
out, issuing of vouchers.
It is this last approach to improving efficiency that will be the 
theme of this paper. The purpose of the paper is to briefly survey some 
trends in an area of efficiency improvement with which engineers have 
some influence, but in which they have had little formal training; viz., 
organizational design and intergovernmental relations.
T H E  SIZE AND E C O N O M IC  O R G A N IZ A T IO N  O F 
M U N IC IPA L  SERVICES DELIVERY
In many cases the delivery area of a municipal service is restricted 
to the boundaries of a particular jurisdiction. The political boundaries 
that often constrain the delivery service area may not be consistent with 
the optimal delivery service area size. Economies of scale may be such 
that larger delivery units would be desirable. Furthermore, in the 
past, the favored economic organization for the production of municipal 
services has been the local governmental department. That is, it has 
been customary for the local government authority to be the sole or 
monopolistic producer of property-related municipal services.
In recent years a trend towards special districting, especially in 
relation to utilities, has become evident. Even more recently trends 
towards the use of other institutional arrangements can now be 
observed in some parts of the country. There appears to be a wider 
effort on the part of local elected officials, administrators, and municipal 
engineers to draw in the profit-making and not-for-profit community 
organizations as partners in the provision of municipal services. Notice­
ably, there is a breaking down of the definite demarcation between 
private and public sectors at the local level.
T H E  FU N C T IO N S OF A PU B LIC  
W ORKS D E P A R T M E N T
The purpose of a public works department is to provide the com­
munity with certain property-related goods and services which for any 
of a variety of reasons are not efficiently provided through the free 
market. A common reason for the public works department having 
responsibility is that by nature the good or service closely approximates 
a pure public good; i.e., individuals cannot be excluded from the use 
or benefits of the good, e.g., streetlighting. Another common reason is 
that production or consumption of a good produces significant negative 
spillovers on the community, i.e., unaccounted for costs or harm such 
as garbage storage.
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I t  is important to highlight that even if a public works depart­
ment has a responsibility to provide a good or service, it does not 
necessarily have to produce it. In providing a service, the public works 




Planning involves estimating of supply and demand functions for 
the good including the forecasting of costs. Financing includes pricing 
and revenue policies, budgeting, and expenditure analysis. Production 
refers to the actual conversion of input resources to desirable out­
comes. Logically, it is not necessary for the governmental unit to 
execute all three functions for each good or service. For example, 
contracting requires planning and financing, but production is achieved 
in the private sector. Regulation calls for planning only by the 
governmental unit.
T H E  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES O F FU L L  
SERVICE DELIVERY T H R O U G H  C IT Y  D E PA R T M E N T S 
There are a variety of advantages and disadvantages associated with 
a city department being both provider and producer of the goods and 
services for which it is responsible. The advantages stem from the 
advantages of bureaucratic structure where the organization is highly 
mission-oriented. Despite the frequent criticisms of governmental 
bureaucracy, without it much of modern governmental administra­
tion would be impossible. Briefly, some advantages are:
— an effective system of coordination over the delivery of the good
—a high level of control
—experts are able to direct and decide
—permanency of operations
—stability even with mobility of personnel
— impartial and apolitical
—minimizes nepotism, favoritism, bribery, and corruption 
On the other hand some major disadvantages are:
—sloth and inertia, resistance to change 
—expert’s insensitivity to citizen needs 
—timidity
—depersonalized service 
—dearth of incentives to improve efficiency
—limitations of the beaucracy as a mechanism for signaling con­
sumer demands and citizen needs
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The central issue is not whether a centralized bureaucracy is 
good or bad, but to what extent does it provide an institutional environ­
ment for efficient service delivery? A systems analytic approach to 
such a question calls for an identification of what other alternatives 
exist.
A L T E R N A T IV E  IN S T IT U T IO N A L  A RRA N G EM EN TS
Apart from operating its own production unit within a govern­
mental department, local government has open to it the following 
options:
—contracts with a private firm 
— establish a franchise
—establish standards of service, certify private vendors, then leave 
it up to consumer choice
—issue vouchers to families, permitting them to purchase from any 
authorized supplier
—contract with another governmental unit 
—consolidate service with adjoining governmental units 
—establish special districts for areawide delivery 
—purchase specialized technical and support services from other 
jurisdictions or private firms
It appears that the choice of an appropriate institutional arrange­
ment depends on the specific characteristics of each good or service, 
the quantity and level of service, and the equity issues involved. It 
appears there is a trend towards matching specific goods and services 
with specific institutional arrangements for their provision and 
production.
TR EN D S IN  T H E  USE O F A LTER N A TIV ES 
T O  C IT Y  D E PA R T M E N T S
Information on trends in institutional arrangements for delivering 
municipal services is limited. “A 1973 survey for the International 
City Management Association (IC M A ) found that 61 percent of 
responding municipalities have formal or informal agreements for the 
provision of services to their citizens by other governmental units or 
private firms.”1 This study and a later one conducted in California by 
the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, UCLA, in 1975 suggests 
that more extensive use is made of alternatives to city departments in
1 E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services, Westview 
Press, Boulder, Co., 1977, p. 116.
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the West than in the East and South. The implications for public 
works engineers in Indiana are that experiences in the West may be 
worth evaluation. The California study interviewed 26 city managers 
regarding their currently preferred arrangements and expected shifts. 
The findings presented in Table 1 show that where city departments 
are the currently preferred arrangement, shifts in the future are 
generally expected. Also expected is a general shift toward more 
private sector involvement in property-related engineering services, 
e.g., tree trimming, street cleaning, refuse collection.
TABLE 1. TRENDS IN THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO
CITY DEPARTMENTS
Current Preferred
Service Choice Expected Shift to
General Law Enforce­ City Department Joint Powers with
ment other Jurisdictions
Fire Protection County Contract Joint Powers with 
other Jurisdictions
Tree Trimming City Department Private Contract
Street Cleaning and City Department Private Contract
Patching
Traffic Signal Private Contract Private Contract
Maintenance
Residential Refuse Private Franchise Private Contract
Collection Private Franchise
Public Transportation Special District Special District
Water Pollution Regional Government Regional Government
Abatement
Planning, Zoning, City Department Regional Government
Subdivision
Business Refuse Private Franchise na
Collection
Solid Waste Disposal County Contract na
Libraries County Contract na
Animal Control and County Contract na
Shelter
Ambulance Services Private Contract na
Source: E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services:
Tow ard  Improved Performance, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1977, p. 123.
REASONS FO R  T H E  USE O F A LTER N A TIV ES 
T O  C IT Y  D E PA R T M E N T S




In recent years there has been a more systematic examination of 
public economy by economists and political scientists. Economists have 
attempted to use the classical microeconomic framework, used so success­
fully to model the free market, to conceptualize efficiency considerations 
in the public sector. A significant branch of economic study now con­
centrates on the theory of public goods, toll goods, and common pool 
resources, on the nature of externalities, and on public pricing. By 
clearly defining the nature of each specific good or service and dis- 
aggregating the production process of each good, opportunities for 
competitive bidding and direct pricing become more evident.
Practical Reasons
Practical reasons stem from a variety of fiscal, personnel, entre­
preneurial, and urbanization consideration:
—avoiding the growth of city employment in which it may be 
difficult to cut back at some later date 
—encourage the growth of the local private sector 
—high capital start-up costs 
—severe hiring restrictions for public employment 
—internal labor problems such as unionization and collective bar­
gaining
—supplemental forces needed to cope with an emergency or high 
demand, e.g., supplemental snow removal 
—need for increased quality control; department becomes indepen­
dent quality control agent
—lower cost of production by private firm or consolidation with 
other governmental units
—multinucleation of urban settlements in counties surrounding cities 
—federal grant programs with uncertain futures increase the appro­
priateness of contractin gout services to private and not-for-profit 
organization
PROBLEM S IN  T H E  SE LEC TIO N  AND 
IM P L E M E N T A T IO N  O F A LTER N A TIV ES 
T O  C IT Y  D E PA R T M E N T S
The following can be identified as the major constraints in imple­
menting institutional change in the delivery of urban services:
—threat of reorganization to city employees; this remains probably 
the major constraint, especially where the local government author­
ity is unionized
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—lack of information about alternative arrangements and their suc­
cesses and failures
— the degree to which performance measures can be specified; pro­
grams with clearly defined outcomes are the simplest to contract 
out
—the department of public works needs personnel and procedures 
appropriate to monitoring performance and contract administration
—procurement process and bidding procedure; problems relate to 
single suppliers in small communities, favoritism, graft, and cor­
ruption
—citizen response may be negative or mixed
—the desirability of devising an incentive system for private providers 
CO N CLU SIO N
An important function of local government is to create appropriate 
institutional arrangements for the delivery of municipal services. In­
creasingly, due to the pressure of the local fiscal crisis, new approaches 
are being explored for the efficient utilization of scarce local public 
revenues. Conventional wisdom has been that the governmental depart­
ment of public works is best able to provide property-related services 
through its own planning, financing, and production operations. Logi­
cally, it is not necessary that governmental provision necessitates gov­
ernmental production. There is an observable trend towards the use 
of alternative institutional arrangements including consolidation, special 
districting, contracting, franchising, issuing of vouchers, and regulating 
the private market. In one direction these shifts indicate a trend 
towards increased cooperation between governmental units. In another 
direction, they indicate a trend to include more competitive elements 
and to draw more directly on the marketing, production, and managerial 
expertise of the private sector.
Most interestingly the trends discussed in this paper highlight that 
public service industries are a complex interdependence of govern­
mental, private enterprise and not-for-profit community organizations. 
The demarcation between private and public sector engineering is 
becoming increasingly fuzzy.
